Hearsay Exception #4 – Statements Made for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment

June 11, 2014

The fourth hearsay exception found in Texas Rules of Evidence 803 pertains statements made for the purpose of receiving a medical diagnosis or treatment. In order to fall within this exception, the statement must describe:

  • the declarant’s medical history,
  • past or present symptoms, pain, sensations, or
  • the inception or general character of the cause or external source of such symptoms, pain or sensations,

and,

  • as the name of the exception suggests, the statement must be reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

As with all hearsay exceptions, the rationale behind this particular exception is deeply embedded in the presumption of trustworthiness that such statements carry. In most cases, the desire for an accurate medical diagnosis and effective treatment, coupled with the understanding that such diagnosis or treatment will depend in part upon what the patient says, is thought to override any motive to lie. A fact reliable enough to serve as the basis for a diagnosis should also be reliable enough to escape hearsay proscription.

When considering the admissibility of such statements, a two-part test is applied:

  1. Whether the declarant’s motive is consistent with the purpose of the rule, and
  2. Whether it was reasonable for the statement to be relied upon for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment.

There are two nuances in the rule that are also worthy of note – statements made during ongoing treatment and statements made to non-medical personnel.

Ongoing Treatment:

The second prong of the test becomes the critical factor in analyzing statements made during ongoing or long-term treatment. Once diagnosis has been made and treatment has begun, the rationale behind this exception may disappear. Because the reports and comments made by a patient during an extended course of treatment may be rooted in different motivations, e.g., denial, deception or secondary gain, or may be influenced by the treatment process itself, these statements may not carry with them the presumption of veracity which forms the basis for this exception. In order for the hearsay exception to apply in this context, the proponent must demonstrate two things:

  1. The truth-telling was a vital component of the particular course of therapy or treatment involved; and
  2. That it is readily apparent that the declarant was aware that this was the case.

Otherwise, in the circumstance of ongoing treatment, the justification for admitting the out-of-court statement over a valid hearsay objection has been held to be simply too tenuous.

Statements Made to Non-Medical Personnel:

One aspect of the rule which is not self-evident is the broad scope of witnesses to which this hearsay exception may be applied. The language of the rule itself does not require that the statement be made to a medical provider, but rather for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. Therefore, under the plain language of the rule, the witness need not be a physician or have any medical training whatsoever. Over the years, the exception has been applied to statements made to psychologists, therapists, licensed professional counselors, social workers, hospital attendants and ambulance drivers. But, under certain circumstances, the exception may extend to friends and family members – or even strangers – if other requisites are present.

The essential qualification expressed in the rule is the declarant’s belief that the statement made will ultimately be utilized in diagnosis or treatment of a condition from which the declarant suffers. The selfish motive for truthfulness under circumstances where deception would likely result in misdiagnosis or error in treatment is sufficient to render such a statement likely trustworthy. That the witness may be a medical professional, or somehow associated with the medical profession, is no more than a circumstance tending to demonstrate that the declarant’s purpose was in fact to obtain medical help for himself. A declarant’s statement made to a non-medical professional under circumstances that show he expects or hopes it will be relayed to a medical professional as pertinent to diagnosis or treatment would be admissible under the rule, even though the witness who actually heard the statement is not a medical professional himself.

- Bonnie Sudderth, Judge of the 352nd District Court, Tarrant County, Texas

 

 


Let’s Talk Hearsay

November 3, 2012

HEARSAY, GENERALLY

Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.[1] The Texas Rules of Evidence define the term “matter asserted” to include any matter explicitly asserted, as well as any matter implied by a statement, if the probative value of the statement as offered flows from declarant’s belief as to the matter.[2] (Under the Federal Rules of Evidence the term “matter asserted” is not defined, thus limiting the applicability of the hearsay rule in federal courts to those matters actually asserted, not to those merely implied.)

TRE 802 boldly declares hearsay to be inadmissible unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute.[3] Never has there been a better example of the “exception swallowing the rule” than in the notion that hearsay is inadmissible. Not counting hearsay that is admissible pursuant to statutory authority, four separate hurdles in the Rules of Evidence themselves must be cleared before hearsay evidence will actually be inadmissible.  In order to constitute inadmissible hearsay, the statement must: (1) fall within the Rule 801(a-d) definition of hearsay and not within the Rule 801(e) definition of “non-hearsay”; (2) not fall within 24 enumerated exceptions which apply no matter whether the declarant is “available” or “unavailable”; (3) not fall within the three other enumerated exceptions which apply when the declarant is “unavailable”;[4] and (4) meet resistance in the form of a timely, specific objection.  The fourth hurdle is especially significant, because if no objection is lodged, hearsay evidence is both competent and probative.[5]

When it comes to hearsay, it is never too ambitious an undertaking to look for an exception for every objection. Even hearsay-within-hearsay is admissible, as long as each offered portion fits a rule or exception.[6]  The next series of posts will examine the hearsay exceptions, but before tackling the exceptions, it might be a good idea to take another quick look at what hearsay is, and what it isn’t.

STATEMENTS THAT ARE NOT HEARSAY

Wise practitioners follow the King’s advice to the White Rabbit and “begin at the beginning”[7] when considering the admissibility of evidence within the context of hearsay. Rather than skip directly to the exceptions, it is usually best to begin with the more fundamental question – is this evidence really hearsay?

The answer isn’t always as obvious as it seems. For example, an attorney need not fret over whether a lunatic’s outburst “Repent now – the end is near!” meets the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule if the statement isn’t offered to prove that, in fact, the world is coming to an end. Not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the apocalyptic warning simply isn’t hearsay to begin with. On the other hand, just because a witness is available and providing testimony in court doesn’t mean that his own prior out-of-court statement isn’t hearsay.  If offered to prove its truth, a prior statement may very well be barred by hearsay notwithstanding the fact that the witness is available in court and subject to thorough cross-examination regarding it.

HEARSAY BASICS

TRE 801 defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The three terms, “statement,” “declarant,” and “matter asserted” are defined in the rule.

The “declarant” is the person who made the statement. The term “matter asserted” includes any matter explicitly asserted, as well as any matter implied by the statement.  “Statement” means: (1) an oral or written verbal expression, or (2) nonverbal conduct, if it is intended as a substitute for verbal expression. Because hearsay statements encompass both verbal and non-verbal assertions, silent gestures such as pointing, nodding, or headshakes may be subject to challenge if these gestures are used as a substitute for a verbal response such as “over there,” “yes,” and “no.”  However, other non-verbal gestures, such as tears, may not be characterized as hearsay if the declarant did not intend the gesture to be an assertion.

In the hearsay context, an out-of-court “statement” will generally fall within one of six categories, as explained below:

  1. Explicit Verbal Assertion.  Example: The statement – “A section of the bridge collapsed, and I fell into the icy water as I walked across it” used to prove that the bridge collapsed and the declarant fell into the water.  HEARSAY
  2. Implicit Verbal Assertion.  Example: The statement – “Don’t walk on that bridge,” used to prove that the bridge was unsafe. HEARSAY
  3. Explicit Non-Verbal Assertion Substituting for Verbal Assertion.  Example: The gesture – a shake of the head in response to the question, “Is the bridge safe?” used to prove that the bridge was unsafe.  HEARSAY
  4. Implicit Non-Verbal Assertion Substituting for Verbal Assertion.  Example: The gesture – declarant grabs another person’s arm to impede his progress as his approaches the bridge, used to prove that the bridge ahead was unsafe. HEARSAY
  5. Verbal Expression. Example: The question – “Do you have a blanket I could use?” used to prove that the declarant was cold. HEARSAY
  6. Non-Verbal Expression.  Example: The gesture – declarant’s teeth were chattering, used to prove that declarant was cold. NOT HEARSAY

As these six examples demonstrate, “statements” can be assertions or merely expressions, explicit or implicit, verbal or non-verbal.  Only in the latter category, the non-verbal expression, does the statement fall outside the definition of hearsay. The nonverbal expression fails to meet the definition of “statement” because the declarant did not intend it to be an assertion.  (According to the rule, only if the declarant intends for his conduct to be an assertion will nonverbal conduct be considered hearsay.)

THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS THAT AREN’T

Sometimes a statement can look like hearsay and sound like hearsay – heck, it can even meet the very definition of hearsay – and still it isn’t hearsay.  To remember which statements fall within this loophole, one must think like a child.  When is hearsay not hearsay?  Either when someone uses magic words, or when your mother says so, that’s why.

Magic Words:  When the mere making of an out-of-court statement – regardless of its truthfulness – has legal significance, then it is magically transformed into a statement of “operative fact” which is not hearsay.  In this situation, even though the statement itself could provide proof of the truth of the matter asserted therein, it is offered for a more essential purpose. For example, when the words themselves constitute a necessary part of the cause of action or defense, such as when the mere making of the statement forms the basis of a fraud claim or constitutes the offer, acceptance or terms of a contract, then the statement itself is an operative fact and, therefore, not hearsay.

Because The Rule Says So, That’s Why:  Then there are those statements which fit squarely within the definition of hearsay, but nevertheless Rule 801(e) simply declares them not to be. Rule 801(e) identifies five categories of non-hearsay statements: (1) prior inconsistent statements, (2) prior consistent statements offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, improper influence or motive, (3) prior statements of identification of a person made after perceiving the person, (4) admissions by a party opponent, and (5) depositions taken in the same proceeding.  (Some of these non-hearsay statements have been discussed in prior posts. Follow the link provided for a more in-depth look at these.)

Keep in mind that when responding to a hearsay objection lodged against these non-hearsay statements, it may be tempting to respond that these statements are exceptions to the hearsay rule.  But, technically, that is not correct.  These statements don’t fall within a hearsay exception – they are simply not hearsay to begin with.

– Bonnie Sudderth, Judge of the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas


[1] Tex. R. Evid. 801(d).

[2] Tex. R. Evid. 801(c).

[3] Tex. R. Evid. 802; see Tex. R. Evid. 801(e), 803, 804.

[4] See, Miranda v. State, 813 S.W.2d 724, 735 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, pet ref’d).

[5] Unobjected to hearsay statements will not be denied their probative value merely because they are hearsay. Tex. R. Evid. 802.

[6] Tex. R. Evid. 805.

[7] Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.


Use of Prior Testimony

November 6, 2011

When it comes to admissibility, all prior testimony is not created equal. In Texas, different rules apply, depending on how it is offered and under what circumstances the testimony was originally given.  

Although it is important to understand how prior testimony may be used generally, the rules regarding its admissibility become particularly important when a case is re-tried after remand or order of new trial, or if an attorney wants to offer testimony at trial that was previously given at a pre-trial evidentiary hearing.  Before an attorney decides to rely on prior testimony in lieu of calling live witnesses, several questions must be asked.  

What type of testimony is it?  There are three types of prior testimony:  (1) affidavits, (2) depositions, and (3) prior testimony at hearing or trial. 

Affidavits.  Affidavits are generally inadmissible at trial to prove the matter asserted therein unless they fall under a hearsay exception in the rules or statutes (such as §18.001 affidavits).  However, even when an affidavit doesn’t fall within a hearsay exception, it will still be given full probative value if it is admitted into evidence without objection.  (This rule is not limited to affidavit testimony, and applies to all hearsay which is admitted into evidence without objection.)  For that reason, it can’t hurt to at least make the offer.  And certainly the parties could stipulate to the admissibility of affidavit testimony in order to streamline the presentation of evidence at trial (or for any other reason).   Furthermore, certain portions of an affidavit could possibly be admissible under rules regarding admissions and statements against interest.

Depositions.  For deposition testimony, the attorney may need to ask additional questions:   Was the deposition given in the same case or a different case?  Is the witness a party? 

Was the deposition testimony given in the same or a different proceeding?  Rule 801(c)(3) of the Texas Rules of Evidence clearly provides that a deposition taken in the same proceeding in which it is offered is not considered hearsay.  Therefore, assuming a deposition is not subject to exclusion under some other rule (e.g., a discovery rule), a deposition taken in the same proceeding is admissible into evidence.  The substance of the deposition testimony, like any other evidence, however, must also meet the requirements for admissibility under all other evidentiary rules as well. 

If the deposition testimony was taken in a different case, then its admissibility hinges upon the question of whether the witness is a party.

Is the witness a party?  If the deposition witness is a party, then testimony given in a different case may be admissible under TRE 801(e)(2), which defines statements by party opponents as “non-hearsay.”  To be admissible under 801(e)(2), the statement need not be against interest, but it must be made by a party opponent.  (A party’s own deposition testimony in a different proceeding may not be admitted into evidence unless it is admissible under some other rule.) 

If the witness is a non-party, then deposition testimony taken in a different proceeding will be admissible only if the deponent is unavailable to testify.  The requirement for “unavailability” is a hurdle for admissibility in some circumstances, but it is not always insurmountable.  First of all, the definition of “unavailable” includes more than death, illness or disappearance.  For example, a witness’s purported “lack of memory” as to a particular matter is sufficient to deem that witness “unavailable” under TRE 804(b)(1), rendering prior deposition testimony on that particular point which was given in another proceeding admissible.  Other situations which will confer “unavailable” status to a witness include:  the claiming of a privilege, refusal to testify (after being ordered to do so by the trial court) and mental infirmity.

Prior Testimony.  Finally, for prior testimony given in the same or other proceedings, the first thing that needs to be ascertained is whether the witness is a party or a non-party?  If the prior testimony comes from a party, then the analysis further examines whether the prior testimony offered was elicited from a party opponent or the party who is offering the testimony into evidence. 

A party opponent’s prior testimony will be treated the same as if it were a party opponent’s deposition in a different proceeding.  Because TRE 801(e)(2) defines statements by party opponents as “non-hearsay,” the hearsay bar would not preclude its admissibility.  However, a party’s own prior testimony is generally inadmissible.  In order for it to come into evidence, the testimony would have to be admissible under some other rule, e.g., as a prior consistent statement offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, under TRE 801(e)(b).  

Prior testimony of a non-party is no different than a non-party’s deposition testimony from a different proceeding.  Before prior testimony of a non-party will be admissible, whether same or different proceeding, the proponent must show that the non-party witness is “unavailable” within the meaning of TRE 804(b)(1) and discussed above.

Even if none of the rules or principles above provide an avenue for admissibility of the prior testimony you want to offer, don’t give up.  Even if the prior testimony is not generally admissible, certain specific portions of the testimony may still be admissible under other theories.  For example, if it’s a statement against interest, it may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay bar, whether made by affidavit, deposition or testimony, by a party or a non-party, in the same or different proceeding.  So keep trying. 

The Rolling Stones said it best:  “You can’t always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you just might find you get what you need.”

 — Bonnie Sudderth, Judge of the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas


Silence as Evidence

August 21, 2011

Earth Day,  1971.  Keep America Beautiful launches a TV ad featuring scene-after-scene of polluted rivers, trash-strewn highways, mountainous landfills and billowing industrial smokestacks, ending with a close-up of an American Indian with a single tear flowing down his cheek.  Not a word was spoken during that 60-second span, yet anyone who saw it is unlikely to ever forget the message.  In fact, even today that commercial is considered one of the most powerful and successful ad campaigns of all time, demonstrating how silence sometimes speaks louder than words.

There are two basic types of silence which are of concern in evidentiary law.  The last blog focused upon mere silence accompanied by no other conduct which would indicate an intention to communicate.  As discussed, under certain circumstances, this type of silence is admissible as an admission.

The second type of silence is nonverbal conduct which substitutes for a verbal expression.  This often involves facial expressions or gestures, such as the single tear rolling down the cheek, the pointing of a finger or the nod of a head.  These forms of nonverbal communication may also, under certain circumstances, be admissible, but because they are meant to substitute for verbal communication, they are admissible only if the hearsay objection can be overcome.

Texas Rules of Evidence 801(d) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  At first blush, this rule would not encompass nonverbal acts.  However, Rule 801(a)(2) defines “statement” to include “nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as a substitute for verbal expression.”  Therefore, when nonverbal conduct is intended to substitute for verbal expression, it will be treated as though the words implied by the nonverbal conduct were actually spoken.  If the conduct or gesture was made out of court and is offered for the truth of the matter inferred by it, then it is subject to the hearsay bar.

Take note, however, that a nonverbal expression is not a substitute for verbal expression unless it was intended to be one.  Both the Texas Rules and the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that nonverbal expressions are considered hearsay only when the nonverbal conduct was “intended as a substitute for verbal expression” or “intended as an assertion,” respectively.  TRE 801, FRE 801.  In fact, this may be the proponent’s best response to a hearsay objection, i.e., that the nonverbal act was not intended as a verbal expression. The burden is on the opponent of the evidence to prove intent, and doubts are generally resolved in favor of admissibility.

There are two other ways for the proponent of the evidence to respond to the hearsay objection.  The first is to argue that the nonverbal statement is not, by definition, hearsay.  The three most common non-hearsay situations are:

  1. when it’s not offered for the truth of the matter asserted — TRE (801)(d);
  2. when it is a prior inconsistent statement — TRE 801(e)(1); and
  3. when it is made by a party-opponent — TRE 801(e)(2).

Even if the nonverbal communication does fit within the definition of hearsay, it still may be admissible as a hearsay exception.  Rule 803 provides a laundry list of exceptions, but those most readily-applicable to nonverbal communication are:

  1. present sense impressions — TRE 803(1);
  2.  excited utterances — TRE 803(2);
  3. statements of existing mental, emotional or physical condition — TRE 803(3);
  4.  statements for the purpose of medical treatment — TRE 803(4); and
  5. statements against interest — TRE 803(24).

If a nonverbal communication falls within one of these, or any other, hearsay exceptions, then it is admissible into evidence as a hearsay exception.

From the opponent’s viewpoint, assuming the proponent has articulated one of these grounds to support his theory of admissibility, then the evidence may still be subject to a Rule 403 objection (probative value substantially outweighed by prejudice, confusion, etc.).  However, Rule 403 should be the argument of last resort. After all, the proponent’s theory of admissibility should not necessarily be conceded, even if it appears facially meritorious.

Many proffers of otherwise hearsay statements on either of the two above-mentioned grounds — as non-hearsay or as a hearsay exception — simply cannot withstand close scrutiny.  For example, an attorney shouldn’t be so quick to accept a proponent’s argument that the statement is offered, not for its truth, but to show motive, when motive isn’t a relevant issue in the case.  Nor, for example, should it be conceded that a gesture made immediately after a traumatic event would fall within the excited utterance exception, absent any supporting evidence that the nonverbal gesture was a spontaneous reaction which was actually related to the event itself, two required elements to prove up an excited utterance exception.

For those who prefer a step-by-step approach to the process of offering and objecting to nonverbal communication:

  1.  The nonverbal act or gesture is offered into evidence.
  2. An objection is lodged that the nonverbal communication was intended as a substitute for verbal expression and is, therefore, inadmissible hearsay. (Without a timely hearsay objection, the evidence is admissible with full probative value, pursuant to TRE 802.)
  3. The proponent of the evidence argues that the nonverbal statement:  (a) was not made with an intention to substitute for verbal expression; (b) is, by definition, not hearsay; or (c) is admissible under one of the hearsay exceptions.
  4. The opponent challenges the proponent’s theory of admissibility, or makes a 403 objection, if applicable.
  5. Await the trial court’s ruling on the matter.

(Practice Note:  As for Step 5, be careful to avoid any nonverbal communication on your own  part.  Neither the dramatic rolling of eyes when you lose nor high-fives when you win are tolerated in most courtrooms.)

– Bonnie Sudderth, Judge of the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas


Judicial Admissions Through Statements by Attorneys

August 2, 2011

Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.  Although the importance of this warning in the criminal law context is well understood, lawyers who venture into the arena of civil litigation would do well to consider how that concept might apply to them.

The reality is that any statement, whether oral or in writing, made to the court by an attorney on behalf of his or her client could potentially be used against that client later in court.  And, unfortunately, the more articulate, lucid and straight-forward the statement, the more likely it is to get the client into trouble.

It is well-settled in Texas law that any assertion of fact not pleaded in the alternative which appears in a party’s live pleadings will be regarded as a formal judicial admission.  Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1983).  As long as the admission stands unretracted, the fact admitted is accepted as true.  Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enterprises, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App. – Tyler 1979).  As with other types of judicial admissions, the statement must be deliberate, clear and unequivocal.  Id.  

Over the years, this rule has expanded beyond live pleadings, to statements made in briefs and other motions, as well as arguments made by attorneys during hearings and at trial, including:

  • Remarks at Charge Conferences:  Attorney’s stated rationale for not lodging an objection to the omission of a separate damage question – that he agreed that the damages already sought under a different legal theory would be the same – was held sufficient to bind his client to that position.  American National Petroleum Co. v. TransContinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 798 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1990).
  • Argument at Trial:  Urging the statement-by-agent hearsay exception as one ground for admissibility of declarant’s statement was an admission establishing that the declarant was his client’s agent as a matter of law.  Carroll Instrument Co., Inc. v BWB Controls Inc., 677 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1984).  
  • Stipulations:  Stipulation by a party that he signed an instrument in the capacity of guarantor is a judicial admission requiring no written evidence of guaranty status, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds.  Menendez v. Texas Commerce Bank, 730 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1987).

Perhaps the biggest trap for the unwary is in summary judgment proceedings.  While it is elementary that pleadings do not constitute summary judgment proof, an exception is made for the admissions contained therein.  Judicial admissions contained in pleadings may be used to support a summary judgment.  Underhill v. Jefferson County Appraisal District, 725 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 1987).

The easiest trap to avoid is typographical errors.  In De La Fuente v. Home Savings Assn., what appeared to be a typographical error as to a particular date in a live pleading was held to conclusively prove that a note was assigned to a third party on the very same day that it was executed, rendering it void and unenforceable by law.  669 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1984) (providing yet another reason to avoid over-reliance on spell-check).

Fortunately, there are some safe harbors: 

  • Law vs. Fact:  An attorney can’t judicially admit what the law is or a legal conclusion to be drawn from facts pleaded.  Barstow v. Texas, 742 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App. – Austin 1988); J.A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Ellis, 412 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1967).  Keep in mind, however, that while the law itself cannot be judicially admitted, judicial error can. Flores v. Texas Department of Health, 835 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App. – Austin 1992) (holding that the defendant’s assertion that he agreed with plaintiff that a particular finding of fact was not supported by the evidence was not “mere acquiescence to appellant’s argument” but a judicial admission “amounting to a confession of error.”) 
  • Impressions vs. Facts:  Statements which are merely impressions may not be sufficiently clear and unequivocal to be considered a judicial admission.  National Savings Insurance Co. v Gaskins, 572 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth 1978).
  • References:  Simple reference to another party’s affidavit will not constitute an admission that the facts contained therein are true.  American Casualty Co. v. Conn, 741 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App. – Austin 1987).  Take care, however, when you assume for purposes of argument that your opponent’s position is true, to clearly demonstrate the conditional nature of your argument.  Hill v. Steinberger, 827 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1992) (wherein movant “accepted as true” all the factual allegations contained in his opponent’s original petition, thereby defeating his own summary judgment motion).
  • Damage Control:  By amending, withdrawing or retracting, you can at least eliminate the binding effect of an admission.  However, the pleading will still remain a statement “seriously made” and can be introduced in evidence as an admission against interest.  Kirk v. Head, 152 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1941).  This is very tricky business, however.  While a request made in final argument for a court to “overlook” an erroneously pleaded fact will not undo the admission, De La Fuente at 145, pleading the opposite or an inconsistent fact in the same document will.  Texas Processed Plastics at 416.

Finally, in an elegant twist of irony that could find its place only in the law, simple ineptitude may be the one sure thing to keep an attorney out of trouble.  Canales v. Canales, 683 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1984) (The transcript of the hearing “fails to convey with any degree of lucidity what was actually said or meant by the attorney.  There can be no judicial admission under those circumstances.”)

– Bonnie Sudderth, Judge of the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas


The Rule of Optional Completeness

June 9, 2011

How many times have you made the following objection in the middle of your opponent’s examination of a witness:  “Your honor, under the rule of optional completeness, may I read the remaining portion of that sentence?”  By making this objection, you are requesting permission to complete the record contemporaneously without having to wait until your turn to examine the witness.

It’s a common enough request that occurs in civil courtrooms every day.  After all, everyone knows that’s what the rule of optional completeness provides.  Right?  Wrong.

Texas Rules of Evidence 107, the Rule of Optional Completeness, provides:

“When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or recorded statement is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and any other act, declaration, writing or recorded statement which is necessary to make it fully understood or to explain the same may also be given in evidence…”

Contrary to popular belief and practice, nothing in Rule 107, the rule of optional completeness, provides for a right to have the additional statement placed into evidence immediately.  It simply provides that such evidence is admissible.  And, while most judges would liberally permit a contemporaneous offer of the additional statement, it would not be error for a judge to require that such evidence be placed into evidence when the objecting party cross-examines or re-directs the witness, as with any other piece of additional evidence. 

But, wait!  Can this be right?  Isn’t there a rule allowing evidence to be admitted contemporaneously? 

Yes, there is such a rule, but it’s not found in Rule 107, the rule of optional completeness.  The rule which permits contemporaneous admission of evidence is Rule 106, Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements.  It provides:

“When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may at that time introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it… “

So, even though the rule of optional completeness does not contemplate a contemporaneous offer, the evidence may be admissible contemporaneously under Rule 106.  But beware — even under Rule 106, there is no guaranteed right to have every sentence read to completion, or any deposition answer fully read contemporaneously with an initial offer. 

Rule 106 provides for contemporaneous admission of evidence only when, in fairness, it ought to be considered contemporaneously with the portion previously admitted.  In other words, contemporaneous admission operates only to prevent unfairness.  Whether fairness necessitates a contemporaneous offer under the circumstances is a factual determination to be made by the trial court and reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 

Furthermore, case law suggests that even when fairness predominates in favor of a contemporaneous offer, Rule 106 does not actually mandate it.  Because Rule 106 was not written in mandatory terms, it would not be error for a court to require (as with Rule 107) that such evidence be placed into evidence at the time when opposing counsel is directing the witness.  Gilmore v. State, 744 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1987).   (“Rule 106 is a narrow modification of the doctrine of optional completeness, controlling the time an adversary can introduce certain kinds of remainder evidence, [but] the language of the rule is a permissive grant and not a requirement.” Id. at 631.)

So the next time you want to have the remainder of a written document admitted contemporaneously after a partial offer has been made, forget the rule of optional completeness.  Instead, focus on the rule of remainder of writings.  A proper request should include a brief statement as to why the remainder of the statement ought, in fairness, be considered contemporaneously with the previous statement, tracking the language of the rule.  

Finally, don’t feel bad that you’ve been misstating the rule for years.  You’re in good company.  At least one frequently-cited appellate decision has confused the two.  Jones v. Colley, 820 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 1992) (“Rule of optional completeness is that if one party introduces part of statement or doctrine, opposing party may contemporaneously introduce as much of the balance as is necessary to explain the first part,” citing Travelers Insurance Co. v Creyke, 446 S.W.2d 954 [Tex. App. -- Houston {14th} 1969].  Travelers, however, makes no mention of contemporaneousness in its explanation of the rule.)

And the next time your opponent interrupts your examination of a witness, demanding a contemporaneous reading of the remainder of a document under the rule of optional completeness, feel free to respond, “Your honor, counsel’s request is improper.  Rule 107, the Rule of Optional Completeness, does not require a contemporaneous introduction of evidence.”

If you want to be so kind as to clue your opponent in that the provisions of Rule 106 might apply, that’s your call.  Or you might decide to let your opponents read the rules for themselves.

-Judge Bonnie Sudderth, 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas


The Limitations on Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements

June 7, 2011

There are few pieces of evidence that attorneys love to lay their hands on more than an opponent’s prior inconsistent statement. Admissibility of these statements is rarely in doubt, and they provide attorneys with a golden opportunity to ask the ever-popular cross-examination question: Were you lying then, or are you lying now?

More troublesome, however, are those pesky prior consistent statements. What should be done when a witness keeps telling the same story, the same way, over and over again?

Offered for the truth of the matter asserted, a prior consistent statement is blatantly inadmissible hearsay. It’s an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and no matter how many times a witness has said it before, frequency will not change that basic analysis.

Setting aside the hearsay problem for a moment, most prior consistent statements won’t even meet a threshold test of relevancy, because most prior consistent statements do not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue. This is because at best, the probative value of a prior consistent statement requires a leap of faith. In order for a prior consistent statement to be relevant, one must believe that if a person has said something enough times, it’s probably true. Common sense and experience tells us that just because grandpa’s been spinning that same yarn for the last fifty years, doesn’t make the tale any less dubious. Luckily, the Texas Rules of Evidence reflect that basic reality. Otherwise, that’s-my-story-and-I’m-sticking-to-it would become the test for admissibility under the rules.

So, for reasons of relevancy and hearsay, the general rule is that a prior consistent statement is inadmissible:

TRE 613 (c): A prior statement of a witness which is consistent with the testimony of the witness is inadmissible except as provided in Rule 801(e)(1)(B).

However, there may be circumstances when a prior consistent statement may become admissible, providing an exception to the general rule:

TRE 801(e)(1)(B): A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.

Some may argue that Rule 801(e)(1)(B) opens the barn door to admission of virtually all prior consistent statements. It does no such thing. Rule 801(e)(1)(B) narrowly tailors an exception unique to particular factual circumstances. In order to be admissible, there must be: (1) an express or implied charge, (2) against the declarant, (3) of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. If the other side doesn’t open the door to this testimony by making such a charge, then Rule 801(e)(1)(B) never comes into play, and the statement remains inadmissible.

The language of the rule is highly restrictive. For example, merely impeaching a witness or calling into question a witness’s veracity will not in and of itself invoke the Rule 801(e)(1)(B) exception. Furthermore, a prior consistent statement will remain inadmissible, even under a charge of recent fabrication, if the statement was made shortly before trial, in anticipation of trial, or after a motive to fabricate existed. Beaver v. State, 736 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1987).

Even when there has been an express or implied charge against the declarant of improper influence or motive, a predicate must be laid for the admission of the prior consistent statement. As a general rule, appellate courts will not require a trial judge to be a mind-reader. Unless it is painfully obvious from the context, rules of procedure and evidence require that an attorney, when faced with an objection, articulate to the judge the purpose of any offer of evidence. Under Rule 801(e)(1)(B), an attorney seeking the admission of a prior consistent statement over objection should be prepared to educate the judge as to the reason why the exceptions embraced in Rule 801(e)(1)(B) apply. It is not the judge’s burden to read between the lines and figure out that the statement would rebut the opponent’s charge. The statement must be “offered” into evidence for that purpose. If the attorney fails to lay the proper predicate for the prior consistent statement’s admissibility, then the judge may rightfully reject it.

Likewise, when challenging an opponent’s attempt to offer a prior consistent statement into evidence, an attorney needs to clearly articulate the basis for the objection. Simply saying, “Rule 801, hearsay” in opposition to a prior consistent statement has been held insufficient to put the trial court on notice as to the particular objection being lodged. Meyers v. State, 865 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th] 1993). A concise statement that (1) the statement offered is a prior consistent statement, (2) which does not fall within the exceptions of Rule 801(e)(1)(B), should be adequate both to make clear your objection and to preserve error on the point, if necessary.

I’ve said all of this before, and now I’m saying it again. It’s just got to be true. And admissible. Well, maybe not.

-Judge Bonnie Sudderth, 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas


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